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ABSTRACT
This module for Involving Anthropology presents an account of one
of the plenary debates held at the International Union of
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (IUAES) World
Congress held at Manchester University, 5-10 August 2013. The
module begins with a brief introduction to provide the context for
the debate, which included two speakers for (Amita Baviskar and
Don Nonini) and two speakers against (Helen Kopnina and
Veronica Strang) the motion: ‘Justice for people must come before
justice for the environment’. The introduction is followed by an
edited transcript of John Gledhill’s welcome and introduction, the
texts of the arguments made by each speaker for and against the
motion (with the exception of Veronica Strang, whose
presentation is being published elsewhere a summary of the
comments and questions subsequently invited from the ﬂoor of
the hall, and then a transcript of the responses of the presenters.
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Introduction: ‘Justice for People Must Come Before Justice for the
Environment’
Simone Abram
Department of Anthropology, Durham University.
The IUAES World Congress 2013 was held at Manchester University, 5-10 August 2013.
The International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (IUAES) (http://
www.iuaes.org/), as its name suggests, brings together scholars from all regions of the
world and all ﬁelds of anthropology (Nas, Zhang, and Ji 2009). Every ﬁve years it holds
a World Congress, with inter-congresses held in the intervening years. One of the features
of the IUAES is that it can be seen as a counterweight to the predominance of Anglo-
American conferences, attracting signiﬁcant participation from Asia, South East Asia in
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particular, and South America. Previous world congresses have been held in Russia,
Mexico, Japan, India and China, as well as in European and North American cities.
The World Congress in Manchester attracted a signiﬁcant participation from Asia,
notably India and Japan (where the subsequent Intercongress was held in 2014).
Despite some very problematic obstacles, notably the unwillingness of the UK Border
Agency to grant visas to visiting academics from several countries, there was broad-
ranging participation in the Manchester congress.
Given the cross-ﬁeld interests in the IUAES, the organising committee of the Manche-
ster World Congress was keen to promote opportunities for discussion between different
anthropological ﬁelds, as well as within them. At the same time, a key goal was to promote
the kinds of important questions on which anthropologists are in a position to comment,
to encourage British media attention, as well as generating participation in the congress.
One way to achieve both goals was to organise plenaries in the form of debates, a form that
is well established at Manchester University’s Anthropology department (via GDAT, the
Group for Debates in Anthropological Theory1). In organising the debates, the committee
was attentive to the nationality, gender, anthropological ﬁeld and ethnographic specialities
of the speakers.
Three debates were held in the plenary hall. The second of these explicitly intended to
generate discussion on one of the primary political issues of our day, the question of
environmental justice. At a time when global talks were pitting economic beneﬁts
against climate risks, the question of justice was one the organisers wished to see from
different perspectives. The second of the three plenary debates addressed the motion:
‘Justice for people must come before justice for the environment’. Amita Baviskar
(Delhi University) proposed the motion, seconded by Don Nonini (University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill). Helen Kopnina (The Hague University of Applied Science)
opposed the motion, seconded by Veronica Strang (Durham University). The debate
was chaired by John Gledhill (Manchester University).
The format of the debate pitches two pairs of speakers to argue for and against the
motion, in turn. Members of the audience are then invited to pose questions to the speak-
ers, and each speaker, again in turn, then presents concluding comments in the light of the
questions and the other speakers’ contributions. After all of the concluding comments, the
audience members are invited to vote either for or against the motion. It should be noted
that in devising the motion itself, the organisers sought to give the speakers an opportunity
to ﬁll out the arguments, raise issues related to the main theme, and explore the nuances
toward which the motion pointed. The debate, with its parliamentary format, is one that
offers an opportunity to elaborate on theoretical and practical implications of the motion.
In the context of the Congress, there were no material consequences to consider (i.e. the
outcome of the vote has no implementation in policy or practice), but the debate is a
vehicle to elaborate key topics in a way that might appeal to a broad audience.
We present here John Gledhill’s introduction, the texts of the arguments made by each
speaker for and against the motion (with the exception of Veronica Strang, whose presen-
tation has been published elsewhere—see Strang 2016). We then include a summary of the
comments and questions subsequently invited from the ﬂoor of the hall, and then a tran-
script of the responses of the presenters. The debate was funded by the University of Man-
chester’s Hallsworth Conference Fund.
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A live stream of the debate can be found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
oldnYTYMx-k
‘Justice for People Must Come Before Justice for the Environment’
JOHN GLEDHILL: The motion we’re going to debate this morning is ‘Justice for people
must come before justice for the environment’. It is intended to be provocative, and if
you don’t like the motion, don’t blame the speakers, because I’m afraid it was mostly—it
wasmainly—my idea. Usually, I have input frommy accomplices in the National Organis-
ingCommittee, but this was basicallymy concept of how to debate it, and the idea is that this
debate is a complement to producing the Earth Track of the congress theme, so it combines
political ecology and political economy.
The sponsor of the debate is the University of Manchester’s Hallsworth Conference
Fund. The Hallsworth bequests funds for postdoctoral research fellowships and visiting
professorships, but the common denominator of all Hallsworth-funded initiatives is
that they deal with political economy in the broadest possible sense, and this isn’t actually
the ﬁrst time we’ve had a Hallsworth debate that tackles economic and environmentalist
issues together in the same frame.
Now, as most of you are probably already aware, but I have to repeat it, the debate is
organised in the following way: each of the four main speakers will speak for ﬁfteen
minutes at the beginning and then I’ll open the discussion up to contributions
from the ﬂoor, for which we should have about 30 minutes. Then I’ll invite each of the
original speakers to sum up or comment on what has been said for ﬁve minutes again
at the end.
I just want to present the speakers very brieﬂy. Amita Baviskar from the Institute of
Economic Growth at Delhi University is going to speak ﬁrst in favour of the motion,
and Amita has made many important contributions to the study of the cultural politics
of the environment and development from a perspective that brings questions of social
inequality and power relations in natural resource conﬂicts, environmental movements,
into very close focus. Her perspective also includes different social classes, social move-
ments with different kind of class bases and ethnic bases.
Helen Kopnina from The Hague University of Applied Sciences in the Netherlands
will speak second against the motion. Helen’s work is strongly focused on the areas of
conservation, sustainability and environmental anthropology, and she has published
some powerful critical interventions in favour of reducing the androcentrism of
much of the contemporary debate, and about taking the rights of non-human species
seriously.
Donald Nonini from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is going to speak
third, again in favour of the motion. Don works on both the Southern United States and
East Asia. His work is very wide ranging and includes critical theoretical contributions to
the cultural politics of class, ethnicity, race, and gender in different kinds of settings, and
the study of global and trans-national processes and the anthropology of the state. His
approach to political economy in the case of Chinese developments has alerted us to
the fact that it’s perhaps not very wise to see the whole world as a replication of the neo-
liberal capitalism of the North Atlantic countries.
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The ﬁnal speaker against the motion is Veronica Strang of the University of Durham
and the new chair of the Association of Social Anthropologists. Veronica’s research is
focused on human-environmental relations from a perspective that explores the cultural
dimensions of the ways in which people engage with resources. Her recent works focus
on what must be one of the most critical issues facing the world today: the question of
water. She takes a cultural perspective on the way people think about issues of water, con-
servation and the symbolic meanings that are attached to water as a vital resource in differ-
ent kinds of cultural contexts.
So that’s our lineup; I’m looking forward very much to listening to them…Okay, let’s
begin.
For the Motion: Amita Baviskar
Between 1868 and 1888, the British government drove out the Baiga, a tribe of shifting
cultivators in central India, from the forests that they had lived in for generations and
herded them onto a reservation. Here, they were forced to settle down and take up
farming with ploughs. The Baiga believed that to plough the land was to wound mother
earth, a violation of their most sacred principle, a betrayal of what it meant to be Baiga.
Forced into an alien occupation, the Baiga suffered what Verrier Elwin ([1939] 2007)
described as ‘a loss of nerve’—a profound and debilitating erosion of morale. From
being shamans and healers, a tribe with knowledge and power, the Baiga became a
broken people, joining the ranks of the wretched of the earth. It took more than 40
years for another generation of Baiga to rise up in rebellion against colonial forest policies
and demand the right to cultivate freely once again.
The displacement and dispossession of the Baiga contain echoes of events that took
place in other parts of the colonial world, including Britain. The woods and pastures of
England had already been placed off-limits by private landowners between 1760 and
1820, impoverishing subsistence farmers who depended on them for their fuel, fodder,
and other modest needs. Karl Polanyi (1944) called this enclosure of the commons ‘a revo-
lution of the rich against the poor’, a revolution where the armed might of the law, the
repressive power of capital punishment, prison and deportment, was wielded as a
weapon to commit what E. P. Thompson (1975) called ‘a plain enough case of class
robbery’. Though poor and desperate peasants fought ﬁercely to hold on to the ancient
customary rights that they valued, they were dispossessed. In Africa and Asia and Austra-
lia, as in Americas, colonial conquest meant that land was acquired by force, native popu-
lations decimated and subjugated, in order to make resources available to the imperial
enterprise.
But the displacement of the Baiga was not justiﬁed as brute force—the power of the
conqueror to call the shots, to plunder and possess at will. The colonial government
took pains to explain that the Baiga practice of shifting cultivation was environmentally
harmful. It was in order to protect the forests, to better conserve them, that the Baiga
had to be conﬁned to a reservation. The Baiga, who had lived in the forests for centuries
without noticeably depleting them, were now blamed as destroyers of the forest, a problem
for the new regime of ‘scientiﬁc forestry’, the technique of replacing diverse tropical forests
with simpliﬁed monocultures of teak and sandalwood that fetched the highest revenue.
Dietrich Brandis, the ﬁrst Inspector General of Forests in India, institutionalised a calculus
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for maximising timber growth, with all other living aspects of the forest seen as unimpor-
tant, at best, and problematic, at worst. With the authority of German forestry experts
backing colonial ideas of ‘environmental protection’, the displacement of the Baiga
became a ‘scientiﬁc solution’. It was, in fact, argued that their transformation into
farmers with settled, steady habits would be morally and economically good for them.
Now this is the point that I want to stress: the colonial government believed that it was
doing the right thing. As Richard Drayton pointed out in his book Nature’s Government,
(2000), the idea that Empire was about improvement, husbanding resources, controlling
lands and peoples for the purpose of conservation, better management for more efﬁcient
utilisation, was an intrinsic part of colonial enterprise. Empirewas justiﬁed as an instrument
of development, of ‘fostering and leading new races of subjects and allies in the career of
improvement’ (Drayton 2000, 94). Managing places and people for their material and
moral upliftment, the paternalistic presumption of ‘allow us to know you better than your-
self’, was the conceit that colonialism maintained even as it wreaked havoc on landscapes
and lives around the world. This paternalistic condescension continues to pervade most
Northern campaigns for saving the planet.
In east Africa, too, environmental conservation was a coercive business, with customary
hunting and grazing practices forcibly curtailed by the colonial government. Rod
Neumann (2001) points out the injustice that, even after independence, local populations
in Tanzania and Kenya still don’t have control over vast tracts of land. And while they are
forbidden to hunt for meat or even to kill predators that menace their livestock, wealthy
tourists from the West are licensed to kill animals as trophies on privately managed
reserves. Double standards and doublespeak have been remarkably consistent features
of saving the environment. Lending legitimacy to such ploys is the narrative of environ-
mental crisis, of catastrophic consequences if the population explodes, if the rains fail, if
we run out of food or oil, if the oceans rise. Without dismissing or diminishing the real
and serious challenges that these pose, one must wonder how the urgent goal of saving
the earth invariably translates into business-as-usual, with the usual suspects—
international conservation organisations funded by corporate donors, governments
backed by national elites, the World Bank and the ADB—providing all the answers on
behalf of the Global North.
If utilitarian ideas of protecting the environment for the greater glory of empire or
capitalism or the nation have dispossessed people and destroyed culturally distinct ways
of living with nature, poor people today have another, even heavier, burden to bear.
This is the so-called biocentric view which claims that all forms of life have a right to
exist, and that environmental conservation is a transcendental goal, one that must rise
above the petty squabbling of social groups about who bears the costs of conservation.
Justice for the environment means respecting the rights of all species, not just humans.
Now this is a noble sentiment, but logically specious. What do they mean when they
want to respect the rights of all species? Do they believe that the smallpox and polio
virus have as much right to exist as the tiger and the blue whale? How about the AIDS
virus or Plasmodium falciparum? Humans make choices about species all the time: this
is a good plant to grow; this is a weed, let’s pull it out. These choices have shifted with
time: for instance, in India, leopards and tigers have gone from being vermin to being
trophy animals to nationally protected species within a space of a hundred years. These
shifts reﬂect the varying cultural perspectives through which nature is everywhere
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FORUM 5
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 W
es
ter
n A
us
tra
lia
] a
t 1
8:2
1 0
8 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
evaluated. The environmental good is a moving target, a fact that should make one ques-
tion even more closely the sacriﬁces that poor people are asked to make for it.
Biocentrism is not a soft-hearted romantic view of respecting the earth. As Ram Guha
(1989) points out, if you look at who its proponents are and what they actually do, you will
ﬁnd a pernicious exercise of Northern privilege. Speaking on behalf of those voiceless
species, Northern biocentrism has supported the creation of large conservation areas,
driving out forest dwellers and extinguishing their rights to subsistence. An even larger,
even obscene, injustice is that even as they expect the Global South to give up the little
that it has, the bio-centrics choose to ignore the inequities in which they themselves are
complicit. As citizens and beneﬁciaries of the military-industrial complex, as consumers
whose endless appetites scoop up resources from around the world, those who claim to
speak for the planet and tell people in the Global South how they should run their
lives, are guilty of forgetting the ﬁrst law of biocentrism: All life is connected.
In addition to the presumption that those who claim to speak for the environment are
somehow morally superior to those who represent forest dwellers, farmers and pastoral-
ists, there is the assumption that an environmental goal is by deﬁnition a universal good
and must prevail over the interests of particular social groups even if they are poor and
exploited. In Delhi, where I live, the cause of creating a ‘clean and green city’ has been vig-
orously pursued by bourgeois environmentalists, who have used the Supreme Court and
the High Court to get rid of thousands of small industries and hundreds of squatter settle-
ments where working class families worked and lived. The instrument for this judicial
action has been public interest litigation—on the grounds that securing clean air and
water and green spaces is obviously in the public interest, the greater common good.
However, the idea of the public is mobilised to exclude and disenfranchise large sections
of the city’s population. The courts and the media have consistently turned a blind eye to
the devastating effects of such projects of urban improvement on the lives of Delhi’s
under-class. That the working poor may have their own environmental priorities, such
as toilets and sewers and drinking water, is not even considered. Nor is the fact that the
greater burden of air and water pollution in the city is generated by the rich, by their
cars and their sewage. In the name of environmental improvement, we get more injus-
tice—for people and, ironically, for the environment.
Protecting the environment, then, seems to be yet another scheme of organising the
world, landscaping the globe into a mosaic of separate zones—extraction, production, con-
sumption, conservation, and so on—designed by the Global North, where conservation
may be another form of elite consumption, of controlling places and lives to feed Northern
desires.
This seems all the more tragic when we think of all the ways in which communities
have, in fact, cared for their environment, often under daunting odds. These examples
of conservation seem like embattled islands in seas where the tide of extractive consumer-
ism is always rising, never receding. In the Niyamgiri hills in Orissa, or in the Narmada
Valley, people have come together to negotiate with the state on their own terms. They
reject how environment and development are brandished as double-edged weapons:
your land, forest and rivers for our money, roads, schools, medicine, our religion, our
values. To speak for the rights of these communities is not to romanticise them as ecolo-
gically noble savages, as bearers of every environmental virtue, but to direct attention to
the processes of capitalist extraction in which power and proﬁt lie in the Global North.
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We need an honest discussion about contending modes of appropriating the environment,
about property rights and planetary priorities: Environment for whom? Which people?
Whose justice? Since the environment exists in culture, it is the cultural modes of produ-
cing and legitimising unequal rights to the environment that we must highlight and
challenge.
Against the Motion: Helen Kopnina
I am going to argue against the motion ‘Justice for people should come before justice for
the environment’.
Having read some of my opponents’ publications, I assume that Amita Baviskar and
Don Nonini will support the idea that conservationists are mostly Western elites and
that their actions impinge upon cultural practices and economic development of local
communities. This argument is well developed in anthropology explicitly criticising con-
servation, where anthropological engagement is seen as a duty to uphold human rights
and indigenous entitlements against Western neocolonialist practices or neoliberal capi-
talist conservation. This critique often involves a discussion of historical contexts in
which conservation areas or national parks were created in developing countries, with
particular emphasis on the critique of the top-down and neocolonial practices, in
which environmental values are seen to be either imposed by post-colonial governments
or by international conservation organisations.
So far, I agree with my opponents, as I too fully embrace and support the efforts of
non-Western communities, minority groups, or marginalised societies in their efforts at
cultural self-determination. In a similar way, the nuanced critiques of prominent
anthropologists Dan Brockington, James Igoe, and Paige West show how large
Western conservation organisations have become commercialised and proﬁt-seeking
themselves, and how native ways of being in the environment have been subjected to
more managerial or prohibitive approaches in which the conservation organisations
proﬁt, while the local communities are left displaced and without compensation
(West, Igoe, and Brockington 2006; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Brockington, Duffy,
and Igoe 2008). Environmentalism or conservation in this context becomes suspect
due to its proximity to the capitalist rapacious, neo-imperialist and even racist enter-
prise which tends to perpetuate environmental injustice through impingement on
human or indigenous rights, while catering to wealthy elites.
In line with the critiques of the neocolonial Western enterprise, I do believe that indus-
trial development—both in socialist and capitalist societies—has ultimately led to the
erosion of cultural diversity and to creation of unwieldy development projects that
tended to enhance, rather than address, current social and economic inequalities. I also
agree that environmental justice, meaning the equitable distribution of environmental
risks (such as pollution) and beneﬁts (such as access to natural resources or conservation
beneﬁts), remains a large global challenge.
Yet, there is part of this critique that I think needs to be examined more closely. In this
well-established critique of neocolonial neoliberal enterprise, the question of ecological
justice, or justice between species, is often completely overlooked. Anthropologists such
as Rosalyn Duffy and Robert Fletcher argue that conservationists impinge upon cultural
practices and economic development of local communities in order to create conservation
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areas and preserve biodiversity. Some engaged critics actually argue that ‘it is ethically pro-
blematic to privilege conservation of a maximum level of biodiversity at the expense of
livelihood security and poverty alleviation’ (Benjaminsen et al. 2006). The well-known
anthropologist Conrad Kottak suggests that it is an anthropological moral duty to prior-
itise people’s interests and ‘not be dazzled by ecological data’ (Kottak 1999, 33). It is this
particular ethical position that people should always come ﬁrst and the rest should be
ignored, as it deserves no moral consideration, to which I would like to object.
Another issue is that environmentalism is not a Western but a universal phenomenon,
and that love of nature is shared by traditional societies. In fact, it was traditional societies
prior to colonialism and prior to economic development that were more naturally intercon-
nected to the greater than human world. At present, however, despite recognition of the fact
that that indigenous people are ‘rarely isolated from global market forces’ (Pountney 2012,
215), anthropologists who defend the ‘people should come ﬁrst’ notion seem to somehow
simultaneously assume that some cultures or societies are still ‘traditional’ and thus reify cul-
tural traditions (implying somehow that some people are really more ‘developed’ than
others) and try to defend the disadvantaged communities’ economic rights (which are any-
thing but ‘traditional’). By talking about natural resources, economic beneﬁts and compen-
sation, supporters of ‘humans ﬁrst’ perspectives also tend to think of these simultaneous
traditional/cultural and modern/economic attributes not only as entitlements, but also as
morally normative categories. Within these categories, ethical considerations often auto-
matically weigh toward ‘disadvantaged’ people and not disadvantaged non-human species.
The counterargument I want to develop here is best summed up in the words of
environmental sociologist Eileen Crist, who simply indicates that what is presently hap-
pening is a great moral wrong of which we are simply not aware: ‘The mass violence
against and extermination of nonhuman nations, negating not only their own existence
but also their roles in Life’s interconnected nexus and their future evolutionary unfolding’
(Crist 2012). In her poignant essay ‘Requiem for a Roadkill’, anthropologist Jane Desmond
(2013) calls for an ethical recognition of animal victimhood. Another anthropologist,
Barabara Noske (1989), has called for anthropologists to heed environmental ethics. In
environmental ethics, the deﬁnition of land ethics comes to mind: ‘[a] thing is right
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It
is wrong when it tends otherwise’ (Leopold [1949] 1987, 224–225). Similar to the land
ethics, the deep ecology movement endorses ‘biospheric egalitarianism’ (Næss 1973),
the view that all living things are alike in having value in their own right, independent
of their usefulness to humans.
I feel that this debate is both extremely important and also extremely non-academic. It
is moral, and it is political, and it is far from scientiﬁc. That is why I very much appreciate
the fact that I was invited to be here. Returning to the original motion of this debate, please
consider the following questions:
. Justice for people must come before justice for the environment?
. Justice for men must come before justice for women?
. Justice for Whites must come before justice for Blacks?
. Justice for heterosexuals must come before justice for homosexuals?
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How is this motion, that justice for people should come before the environment, different
from the good old ‘might makes right’ assumptions? I would like to ask the audience some
more questions:
. Are these questions appropriate for anthropology and anthropologists?
. Why is racism, sexism, and every form of human discrimination seen as ‘bad’ in anthro-
pology and yet discrimination against other species is exempt from the moral sphere of
judgment?
. Should engaged anthropology not include ecological, not just environmental justice?
. If ethics can be seen as ‘progressive’, should environmental rights not follow human
rights, women’s rights, minority rights, etc?
. Now when entire species are used for mass production and consumption, or critically
endangered or at the brink of extinction, is it not time to acknowledge environmental
rights?
. What is the basis of moral judgment that makes one species—not just the rich and the
poor, the white or the brown within the species—so far superior and worthy of moral
consideration than all the millions of the earth’s other living beings?
I agree with the proponents of the motion that culpability for ecological problems lies
largely with corporate and political elites that perpetuate the industrial economy, mass
consumption and commodiﬁcation of nature. Yet, I disagree that environmentalism is
western, elitist, and neocolonial. Environmentalism, and the love of nature, belongs to
all people. As Shiva (2012), has said: ‘When nature is a teacher, we co-create with her
—we recognise her agency and her rights’. I also do not doubt that without environ-
mentalist activists, the very power hegemonies that all of us criticise will continue una-
bated, erasing cultural memory that used to foster sustainability and preserve
ecological knowledge. What seems neocolonial to me is not conservation or environ-
mentalism, but the insistence that we should look at everything in monetary terms,
that we should abandon nature, or rather use it as a natural resource for our enrich-
ment, that we are above nature, and that all that matters is how equitably the bits and
pieces of wilderness that remain are divided between human populations. This think-
ing is in no way ‘traditional’, but reﬂective of what proponents of economic develop-
ment would like us to embrace.
Privileging one species over all others tends to render the world as perhaps the same
as what very corporate, political, proﬁt-driven elites would like to see—productive, efﬁ-
cient, devoid of emotions, consciences and beauty. Yet, we are all intertwined, all
affected. After all, environmental degradation affects us all, either through climate
change or pollution, or through the erasure of biocultural diversity. As Siddharth Chak-
ravarty, a First Ofﬁcer on the Sea Shepherd vessel renamed Steve Irwin, has said, ‘It is
important to preserve the biodiversity of the planet. If the oceans die, we die.’
Presently, we ask: What is the maximal number of people for which the Earth can
provide resources without severely degrading those resources for future human (sic!) gen-
erations? How can environmental justice (equality in distribution of environmental risks
and beneﬁts) serve all human beings? Yet, what about those ‘others’ that are driven to
extinction, turned into ‘roadkill’, relegated to the beyond-moral-consideration realm of
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collateral damage when huge areas of the rainforest are cleared for cultivation. Can we still
speak about Justice?
Should we not ask instead, returning to Crist (2012): How many people, and at what
level of consumption, can live on the Earth without turning the Earth into a human
colony founded on the genocide of its non-human indigenes? The latter is rarely posed
because the genocide of non-humans is something about which the mainstream culture
observes silence. Academics largely follow suit, perhaps because they view raising an
issue about which silence is observed as a non sequitur (Crist 2012). Thus, I disagree
that we should stop at environmental justice deﬁned by social equity and economic redis-
tribution only. Injustice affects some more than others, and this effect goes beyond the
questions of economic beneﬁts and cultural determination. It effects the very survival of
numerous living beings.
Considering the fact that continuous advocacy and representation are needed to rep-
resent non-humans (who will never speak for themselves), we need to push the ecological
justice debate beyond academic compounds. This might require much more ‘afﬁrmative
action’. This implies the need to develop a post-racial, post-gender, post-class, undifferen-
tiated humanity so we can develop responsibility for other species. If social altruism can be
learned (assuming that acquisition of ethical values is socially and culturally conditioned)
or morally developed (assuming that there is such a thing as moral progress), this has sig-
niﬁcant implications for fostering biospherical egalitarianism and supporting biocultural
diversity.
Finally, I would like to leave you with the story of Ganesha and the cat.
As a child, Ganesha loved playing with his bows and arrows. Spotting a white cat one day, he
decided to play hunter and shot arrows at it. The terriﬁed creature ran for cover, but Ganesha
thought it was playing a game.
He looked behind a tree—there it was, trembling and round-eyed. ‘Aha, got you!’ said the
chubby god and shot at it again. Miaowing with fear, the cat scooted for cover under a
log. Ganesha chased it down and pulled it out. He rolled it around in the mud and threw
it up in the air like a furry ball! Once more, the cat escaped. Ganesha lost interest and
went back home.
He was in for a shock. There sat Parvati, his lovely mother, her face and arms scratched and
mud-stained.
‘Ma, how did you get hurt?’ cried the little fellow.
‘I’ve no idea,’ said Parvati. ‘What have you been up to?’
‘I was playing with a cat and… um… I was pretty rough with her.’
‘Now I know why I have these bruises!’ said Parvati. Drawing Ganesha close, she explained,
‘Ganesha, my body is the world and every living creature in it. I was that cat, too! Whatever
you do to other beings, you do to me as well!’
Ganesha was stunned and deeply remorseful. ‘So my every little action matters…wow! I’m so
sorry, Ma. I’ll never do harm to anything… ever!’
Smiling at her son, Parvati said, ‘That may not be possible, son. But do be aware of your
actions and harm as little as possible.’
Nodding, Ganesha ran off to ﬁnd the little cat and make peace with her.
In my last slide, you can see the picture of my three kids that I left in Colorado during the
holiday to come here. I came here because I think that their future—and the future of bil-
lions of other children, kittens, and cubs depends on whether we take a ﬁrm ethical and
political stand, within and beyond academia.
I ask you to vote against the motion.
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Seconding the motion: Don Nonini
In this debate, I second this motion. My argument will brieﬂy proceed as follows.
Philosophical argument against the opponents to the motion
First, I will argue that it is inconsistent and fallacious to argue for justice for the environ-
ment as distinct from justice for people who are organically part of an environment. The
opponents to this motion are caught on the horns of an intractable dilemma. Either they
must argue that humans are not part of the environment, or they must argue that humans
are part of the environment, but should be an inconsequential element within that
environment, somehow subtractable from it in such a way that what is non-human,
thus puriﬁed of the human, can be said to be the environment for which justice can be
posited.
If the opponents to the motion adopt the position that humans are not part of the
environment, then they have made an assumption that is empirically incorrect. It is mani-
festly the case that human beings are one species that participate actively in networks of
metabolic interactions with other species. Human beings depend upon other species for
digestion, respiration, waste disposal, shelter, protection, etc., and the other necessities
of human life. In turn, humans also have acted, not always under speciﬁc conditions of
their choice, as stewards for the reproduction and continuity of survival of non-human
species. They voluntarily promote the survival of species (and networks of species)
which they domesticate, cultivate, and protect from incursions by other humans or by
non-human species; they involuntarily serve as food and as environments themselves
(e.g. in the case of the thousands of species of bacteria that are part of the human
micro-biotic environment), as reservoir (e.g. for parasites during part of these species’
reproductive cycles), etc. To engage in the pretence that human beings are not part of
the environment in this sense is to engage in a kind of counterfactual fantasy that
should be easily dismissed.
If, on the other hand, the opponents to this motion argue that humans, although part of
the environment, should be relegated to a much more inconsequential part of that
environment, such that their welfare can and should be subtracted out from that of the
non-human elements (both living and nonliving matter) of the environment, then
what? The idea is that humans should just go away; that apparently it would’ve been
much better for the purposes of justice if they had never existed to begin with. This,
one can demonstrate, is the foundational assumption behind most forms of Malthusian-
ism. In this case, however, not only do the opponents of this motion engage in an anti-
social, indeed anti-human argument, but they do so on ﬂimsy philosophical grounds.
Here our opponents ﬁnd themselves caught on the horns of another intractable
dilemma. Either they ask the same humans to legislate their own non-presence in the
environment, since it is only humans who can seek and obtain justice—not other living
or nonliving forms of matter—but this would require the self-annihilation, or at least
self-dispossession, of humans who would extract themselves from ‘the environment’.
Now, I would argue this is empirically extremely unlikely, and morally repugnant! The
other horn of the dilemma would have to be that justice for the environment in this
case requires that some humans legislate, in the interest of justice, that other humans
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who are part of speciﬁc environments other than the environment of such legislators be
removed from these other environments in order to be more just to the non-human
elements of those environments that remain. This second horn of the dilemma, I would
argue, is precisely what the opponents to this motion would have to favour, but this con-
ception of justice presupposes processes of violent dispossession which have historically
been associated with imperialism and the triumph of supposed ‘civilisation’ over those
who are ‘primitive’, etc. One might take, for example, the numerous opportunities that
European colonial administrators in South East Asia employed to ‘prove’ that swidden cul-
tivation by indigenous peoples was necessarily ‘wasteful’ and ‘inefﬁcient,’ thus demanding
their removal from such lands in the interest of ‘the Crown’ and similar imperial entities.
In other words, this is where the ‘rubber hits the road, or tarmac,’ where a broad principle
that humans ought to be extracted from the environment they depend upon in order to
save it, improve it, protect it, etc., is distilled down to, and hypostasised into, the ugly
facts of colonialism and imperialism, of ‘native removal’, ethnic cleansing, and the like.
The Substantive Case for the Motion
It is time to move beyond such logical difﬁculties for our opponents to state the positive
case for our motion—that justice for people must come before justice for the environment.
To begin with, it is necessary to examine the intertwined facts of history and nature that
were (in my opinion) incorrectly opposed in the prior debate of Monday. In other words,
to start with, instead of speaking of ‘the environment,’ let me instead speak of nature, and
the role of history in its making.
‘Nature’ in the sense that we have to use it today is one based on ‘second nature’—the
conception by Marx and Engels that nature under capitalism is nature transformed fun-
damentally by human activity. In contrast, as Marx and Engels put it in The German Ideol-
ogy, ‘Nature, the nature that preceded human history… is a nature that no longer exists
anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of recent origin)’ (Marx and
Engels 1973, 63). In other words, neither nature nor the environment as they are consti-
tuted remain unmarked or untransformed by human activity. While our opponents will
concede that this is so—because it is presumably the source of their complaint that
there is insufﬁcient justice ‘for the environment’—it has implications to which they
have not sufﬁciently paid attention.
The principal issue that our opponents have neglected is that if nature is indeed second
nature transformed by human activity and practice, then justice for nature or the environ-
ment is inextricably connected to justice for human beings—that is, justice toward human
beings in the process of their transformation of nature. And, following the premises of
Marx and many subsequent thinkers within political economy, justice toward human
beings in their transformation of nature is necessarily justice in their relationships to
one another. This is now what we need to consider.
However, what are these injuries to the environment that our opponents (and indeed we
ourselves) see requiring redress? What are the elements of the ‘planetary ecological crisis’?
These would include within the period of last 300 years of industrial capitalism: the signs of
global climate change (the melting of the Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets, a rise in sea level,
rapid decrease in glaciers, ocean warming and a consequent dramatic decrease in oceanic
phytoplankton, droughts over wide areas, and extreme weather events). But beyond local
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climate change, we can refer to ocean acidiﬁcation, the extraordinary burden of nitrogen
and phosphorus runoff into the fresh and salt waters of the earth, the disappearance of
fresh water due to disruptions in planetary hydrological cycles, deforestation, and atmos-
pheric loading with toxins, in addition to emissions of carbon dioxide that are the principal
source of global warming. All these changes represent profound harm to nature and the
environment, characterised most dramatically in the extraordinary loss of animal and
plant species in what paleontologists are now calling the ‘sixth great extinction’. Any
sense of justice to which most humans would hold in the face of these transformations
would seek to redress and even reverse these transformations in order to seek the best poss-
ible remaining prospects for the survival and enhancement of humans and other lifeforms
on earth.
Here’s what it comes down to. I wish to simply observe that by far themost crucial deter-
mining factor, as well as the most deleterious force, with respect to these major transform-
ations in the planet’s ecologies has been the actions of, ﬁrst, modern colonial and, now,
transnational industrial capitalisms and their compliant nation-states. Over the last two
centuries, startingwith but not limited toWesternmodernity (because of the complete com-
plicity of Asian capitalisms in these transformations), these actions have led to the massive
exploitation/extraction of natural resources, including non-human biota and ﬂora, and the
reorganisation of their production and extraction by industrial means.
If we but note the effects of industrialised agriculture, in which food is produced with
industrial methods in massive, simpliﬁed monocropped plantation ecologies, processed in
energy-intensive ways, transported over thousands of miles, and marketed to wealthy
‘consumers’, all to further the expanded capital accumulation of a few number of transna-
tional food processors, traders, and retailers, then we can quickly see how central and
deeply implicated are the indeterminately expansive logics of corporate capitalism in
these harmful transformations of planetary ecologies. Industrialised agriculture,
however, has also reduced hundreds of thousands of people to no more than the ‘backs’
and ‘arms’ of proletarianised farm labour that these corporations require.
But we could also give innumerable other examples from extractive capitalism of how
injustices to people are linked to injuries to natural ecologies—whether it is despoliation of
land and freshwater for farmers by the corporate copper and nickel mines in the Andes, or
of the deltaic, littoral, and oceanic ecologies of the Gulf region of North America, which
has ruined the livelihoods of ﬁshers brought about by the massive BP oil spill. And in the
most recent form, the dominance of ﬁnancial capital, we can speak of massive ‘land grabs’
in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, the ‘ﬁnancialisation of nature’, and of speculative
ﬁnance in the ongoing commodiﬁcation of hundreds of thousands of numerous forms of
goods previously held in common by humans—and of the displacement of prior occu-
pants of land and users of resources.
Now having stated as much, it is also straightforward to observe that the expansion of
industrial and ﬁnancial capitalism across the planet over the last three centuries has been
the major, if not the only, source of injustice toward human beings. This is at no time
more obvious than in the current period of neoliberal capitalism, in which, as David
Harvey andnumerous other commentators have demonstrated,millions of people are experi-
encing accumulation by dispossession, intrinsically in the course of capitalist expansion and
the environmental transformation of nature it has entailed. However, accumulation by dis-
possession has been a recurrent feature of modern capitalism over the last several centuries.
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Whereas today millions of farmers are forced off land to install hydroelectric projects in the
Middle Yangzi River to promote China’s capitalist industrialisation, three decades previously
millions were forced from their lands by the hydroelectric and other massive development
projects of the World Bank. We are talking of nothing less than what Horkheimer and
Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972) called the ‘instrumental domination of nature’
associated with capitalist expansion and accumulation on a world scale.
What we are therefore arguing is that appropriation of nature via capitalist industrial
means and the grossest and most abusive exploitation of human beings have necessarily
gone together. Since we are referring to both human beings—qua exploited surplus and
displaced labour—and the ‘environment’ or nature as what is being depleted, ruined,
etc., it is important to realise that the processes of capitalist appropriation and realisation
of surplus value and of environmental degradation/simpliﬁcation have always gone
together. Coal mining corporations in West Virginia in the US not only degrade the
environment through ‘mountain top removal’, but also degrade the lives and living con-
ditions of human beings—not only those who are employed by these corporations (who
experience multiple occupational injuries such as black lung disease), but also those
people living in the ‘environment’ of the mines.2
Summation
Here is the concluding gist of my argument, in the form of several modest proposals.
1. Coincidence. If the causes of injustice to people and of injustices to nature are so closely
intertwined, so too must be justice toward people and toward nature. Our motion states:
‘Justice toward people must come before justice toward the environment’—not that there
is to be no justice for the environment. Contemporary corporate capitalism is engaged
simultaneously in carrying out multiple forms of injustice directed toward millions of
people by disrupting and destroying their livelihoods, even as it is also engaged in perpe-
trating multiple injuries to environmental ecologies and the material (bio-chemical)
infrastructures and processes that make these ecologies possible.
2. Mutual Implication. It is abundantly clear by now that these insults toward the
environment also imply injuries and abuses of human beings, because the former
have adverse impacts on human livelihood and survival even in the middle term—
that is indeed what global climate change and the other dimensions of the planetary
ecological crisis imply.
3. Prior Qualiﬁcation. Abused and exploited humans are in no position to remediate
environmental injuries; dispossessed, the victims of the structural violence of capital-
ism, they lack the surplus capacity and political power to redress these injuries. Only
ﬂourishing humans are in a position to make such changes.
4. Multiplicity of Struggles. Therefore, the only justice possible for the environment
requires concomitant or prior justice for human beings, and that form of justice in
today’s world must come out of multiple struggles, in many different locales,
on many different fronts, against the abuses associated with transnational corporate
capitalism—its mistreatment of human beings in the name of capital accumulation,
but also its degrading transformations of nature in accordance with its indeterminately
expansive logics on a ﬁnite planet.
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5. The Only Possible Prospect. Justice and morality are distinctively human. ‘Justice’
depends upon moral values and practices, and ultimately on moral action. But
human beings are necessarily motivated by questions of their own survival, and the
majority of human beings alive today are necessarily so motivated, even as they are
subject to the oppressive conditions of capitalist power. The fundamental question is
how to transform such motivations toward human ﬂourishing to include the ﬂourish-
ing of nature (biodiversity, etc.) on which humans depend, and to mobilise both into
speciﬁc forms of struggle against capitalist injustice. This is the only prospect before us,
since nature divorced from humans cannot seek justice. Therefore not only in the
ethical sense, but also in the pragmatic issue of ‘What is to be done?’, the answer
can only be: ‘Justice for human beings must come before justice for the environment.’
See Strang (2016) for the text of her contribution to the debate.
Summary of Questions and Comments from the Audience
(NB: During the discussion, no speakers identiﬁed themselves by name. It is possible to
watch the debate online, at the URL noted above).
The discussion began with a suggestion that each of the presentations had argued in a
similar vein, that justice for people must come with justice for the environment—a theme
that then ran throughout the discussion (along with appreciation of the speakers’ presen-
tations). There was general agreement that in Anthropology, there is a broad awareness
that the dichotomy between people and the environment is historically situated, and
that there are many people in the world who are committed to the interconnectedness
of things and beings (an example was offered of Zuni people endowing things with per-
sonhood). One contributor observed that the human body itself consists of more cells
that are non-human than human, reinforcing the illusory quality of the dichotomy
between the human and non-human.
Two key issues were raised in relation to the opposition between environment and
people. The ﬁrst related to the hierarchy of justice implied by the motion. Transposed
to a set of questions about whether justice for men should precede justice for women, it
is apparent that the grammatical structure creates a false equivalent, which requires an
entity named the environment to be anthropomorphised in order to allow it a place in
this hierarchy. As such, it normalises the Western traditions of instrumental reason,
rather than generating a more inclusive awareness of the human. It also presumes that
the problem of justice for people has already been resolved, as though having addressed
questions of gender or ethnicity, we might now turn to justice for animals and plants.
The second substantive point builds on this lack of progressive justice, in relation to the
use of environmentalism (the prioritisation of justice for the environment) as a political
tool of the privileged. There are numerous instances in the ethnographic literature of
cases where conservation has been pursued at the cost of the most deprived people,
where progressive inequality has been justiﬁed in the name of conservation. In a Latin
American context, for example, it was claimed that environmentalism and conservation
are political tools of the rich. Yet, environmentalism has also been exploited by indigenous
and minority groups. Two examples were raised: ﬁrst, the case of the Yanomamo leader
who presented himself using shamanistic discourses to appeal to environmentalists in
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Brazil; second, the rubber tappers’ leader in Brazil, Chico Mendes, who achieved inter-
national recognition by engaging with the environmental movement.
These examples also suggest that the term justice itself requires closer inspection, since
much of the discussion appeared to be focused on distributional justice, while procedural
and interactional justice may prompt a different dynamic between the environmental
and the human (again illustrating the difﬁculty of leaving behind the dichotomy while ana-
lysing it). Contradictions between ethical claims to justice and legal deﬁnitions of justice
would require further attention for the debate to progress. Questions might include
whether non-humans should have rights, what those rights should be and how those
rights should be balanced with the rights of humans, for example.
Responses by the Debate Contributors
AMITA BAVISKAR: Thank you for that amazing array of questions and comments. I
don’t think I can do justice to even the majority of them, but I’ll try and weave some
answers into what I’m going to say now. Let me begin by quoting Raymond Williams
from his essay, ‘Ideas of Nature’. ‘The idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed,
an extraordinary amount of human history’ (Williams 1980, 67). He says, ‘We’ve mixed
our labour with the earth, our forces with its forces, too deeply to be able to draw back
and separate either out’ (Williams 1980, 83). But the idea of nature or the environment
as a separate realm lying outside culture is still one of the chief organising ﬁctions of con-
temporary conservation, and I think when some of you said:
We need to get away from this dichotomous formulation, this motion that justice of people
must come before justice with the environment, and replace it with something that says, ‘The
justice for people must come along with justice for the environment’.
I think we’re in a way trying to avoid a really difﬁcult question, which is that we can never
know what constitutes justice for the environment. Sure, strip mining is worse than
swidden cultivation, but, as the example of ﬂying told us, these choices are actually incred-
ibly complicated. How do we know that protecting one species or protecting one ecosys-
tem is more important than protecting others, especially when we’ve discussed the cost
that these entail? So what we can know a little bit about—and I think that one certainty
is something that we must hold on to as a precondition for a dialogue on conservation
—is the idea of justice for people, because, when we’re talking about people and the
environment together, we can only talk about them in interrelated ways.
If there’s one thing that anthropologists and ecologists agree on, it is an appreciation of
diversity; it is an appreciation of the ways in which we can’t talk about the environment or
people in the abstract as homogenised entities, but we have to talk about particular groups
of people, their speciﬁc characteristics as culturally bound, culturally shaped communities
embedded in speciﬁc power-laden relations, as much as we have to talk about the speciﬁc
forms that ecosystems and ecosystemic processes take. So when we begin with that idea of
diversity and the appreciation of inequalities within that diversity, I think we have to say
that recognising that diversity is something that can be discussed among people, is some-
thing that we can begin with, and it is only through people that we have access to the
environments over which they claim to have multiple claims. So, both in terms of substan-
tive as well as procedural justice, I think we have to begin with looking at different people,
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different stakeholders if you will, who lay claims to the environment, and we have to be
able to negotiate those claims on terms of greater equality than is the case now. Ethical
questions are always political questions; I can’t distinguish between the two. So when
we’re talking about the issue of race or gender or caste or religion or nation, and the ques-
tion, as Helen asked is, ‘Why can’t we apply these ideas and also talk about the environ-
ment question in the same way?’, I’d say that all of these questions are asked with reference
to speciﬁc populations. To which speciﬁc populations do we pose the environmental ques-
tion? That is indeterminate in a way that isn’t the case with gender or with particular clai-
mants to religious or national or other identities. So, it’s only when we can recognise the
diversity of claims, their plurality in relation to the environment that we can talk about
environmental rights as something which is equally contentious along with other kinds
of identities. I think that’s about all that I want to say.
I mean, I appreciate the point about the different ideological forms that environment-
alism takes, from, progressive, socialist versions to fascist ones, and I agree that there are
extremely sophisticated networks that bind people together in these circuits, in these
increasingly transnational circuits of environmentalism, and, we just have to be attentive
to the ways in which there are many frictions within these as well. You gave one example
from the Amazon; I’d give another of the Rainforest Alliance and its support for the
Kayapo whose leader was projected as, somebody who was the ‘Spirit of The Rainforest’
and who later, when the Kayapo did, in fact, gain control over their territories, went on
to make deals with timber contractors. So, one can’t take environmental virtue for
granted. One can only see it as one more currency in a world where this certain form
of Indigenous performers gets rewarded. In fact, one must never question the terms on
which that discourse happens, where the Kayapo are incarcerated in the rainforest and
forced to perform a certain kind of exotic notion of indigeneity for the consumption of
their so-called supporters in the Global North. And, again, I want to highlight that I’m
using the term ‘Global North’; by no means do I want to suggest that it’s the West
versus the East. In my own country I belong to a class that certainly does claim to
speak for the environment in terms of great nationalist fervour and that has been
equally destructive of the rights of other people and other citizens of India and the
world. Thank you.
HELENKOPNINA:Well, a few points that I ﬁnd common to our discussion, as well as one
from theﬂoor, [concern] the point of commodiﬁcation of nature; I thinkwe all agree, all four
of us, that the rapacious capitalist enterprise tends to turn everything into marketable com-
modities, tends to value nature as natural resource, ecosystem services, whatever the popular
World Bank or IMF terms are, and is largely responsible for global imbalances in social
terms, as well as, ecological terms. I think what all of us are also addressing here is the
idea that you have power relations in which, indeed, a large percentage of the commu-
nities—human communities, as well as non-human communities—are disadvantaged.
My own ethnographic vignette—to add to what we’ve heard before—my own research is
about environmental education and actually Western style of consumption; my recent
articles address Dutch school children and Dutch business students’ opinions about
things like transportation use and consumption. It’s remarkable coming from this
Western world, indeed, how unsustainable our lifestyles are, and even despite the ecological
modernisation theory or ecological Kuznets curve that at ﬁrst you have some kind of
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accumulation of polluting, unsustainable practices and then they eventually lead to ecologi-
cal, more green technologies, etcetera. Well, look around you in Manchester, look around
you in whichever country you go to in the West, and you’d see how unsustainable our
level of consumption is. So, I think one of the most interesting things I brought out of it
myself from listening to all of you here is that we all agree that we have to look at the
Western model of consumption and capitalist enterprise.
Another thing I think we all agree on, and that came from the ﬂoor as well: Away with
dichotomies and away with this idea of seeing nature, culture as completely separate and
mutually exclusive. However, a word of caution: Of course, there are conﬂicts, develop-
ment versus conservation conﬂicts; it’s not always easy to make a decision that’s going
to be mutually reinforcing or, as sustainable development rhetoric would have it, well,
to both have your cake and eat it.
I also very much like Amita’s last point about appreciation of diversity, basically both
cultural, I would say, and ecological diversity. A lot of questions from the ﬂoor had to do
with a deﬁnition of justice, and I’m glad to see that Veronica jumped in, and she talked
about justice a bit, deﬁnition[ally], I mean there’s a lot to be said about it, and I
suppose all of us will be writing about it in our articles. Last point I want to make to
protect my own point: I think we need an afﬁrmative action for those who cannot
speak for themselves. They will never speak for themselves. Women would; they can
talk. Men—you know Black people can, homosexuals can speak for themselves.
Wallabies—whatever other [for which] you see the extinction curve—will never. And
the thing is not everything is needed in this interconnected axis for human survival.
We can survive with monocultures; Vandana Shiva talked about monocultures of the
mind, but the thing is we can also survive with agriculture monocultures. So if wallabies
or bees or whoever is out of the equation, actually, ironically, nothing happens. We’re not
that interconnected, frankly speaking. We can do with GM foods as well, genetically modi-
ﬁed. For that matter I would really argue—and that point is perhaps much stronger than
anything that came out today—for some kind of ecological, let’s say, representation, pol-
itical representation, of those groups that can never speak for themselves in our human
communities. Thank you.
DONALD NONINI: I think as anthropologists we all prize diversity; we prize biological
diversity, cultural diversity, social diversity and many kinds of diversity. The impetus of
my comments that tied together a history of two hundred to three hundred years and
more of the transformation of nature and the transformation of the relationships
between human beings and one another and humans beings and nature, tying that into
capitalism, is—and I don’t want to be misunderstood here—that deeply in these processes
of the appropriation of land, fresh water, mineral resources and so forth, are processes of
profound, penetrating, if you wish, simpliﬁcation of precisely those things that we are
talking about, celebrating as a discipline. I found myself forced into this Procrustean
form that the debate seems to require, at least to my own estimation, to concentrate on
some of the philosophical logical fallacies of the opponents to the motion, while sketching
out a broad history as I saw it, in which this dual transformation of human beings and
transformation of nature go side by side—continues concomitantly and has for several
centuries in the direction of environmental simpliﬁcation; hence, my example of mono-
cropping, which has increasingly become the basis of the corporate food economy and
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so forth. I think, I want to backtrack a bit and say I appreciate very deeply the complex-
ifying questions and richly drawn questions from the audience; they bring up many issues
which some of our comments have previously addressed.
I will say one thing about the opponents representing nature. There is a joke from one
Indian philosopher, some of you may know it: the devil and his companion are walking
along the road together and ahead of them they spy a ﬁgure bending over and picking
up something in the middle of the road, and it’s glittering, and it’s gorgeous. And the
friend of the devil asks the devil, ‘Well, who is that, that is up ahead?’, and the devil
replies, ‘Well that’s humanity,’ and the friend of the devil then proceeds to ask the
devil, ‘Well, what is it that humanity has discovered in the road that’s glittering and beau-
tiful?’, and the devil replies, ‘Well, that’s truth; that’s what humanity has found.’ The friend
of the devil, then, quite surprised, steps back and says, ‘Well, isn’t that really bad news for
you?’ The devil, says, ‘Oh no, no, no. Let’s go ahead, catch up with her and help her organ-
ise it.’ That’s the problem with representing non-human nature, right? Okay.
The joke byKrishnamurti is one that, I think, pokes fun at our liberal sense of entitlement
to discover new truths, simple truths, and represent them and package them—represent
interest and package interest in the name of justice. And our motion, if it does anything
else, if it is passed today, it will suggest that those massive simpliﬁcations which we ﬁnd
in liberal democracy, which we ﬁnd rather difﬁcult to understand and whose results, out-
comes we ﬁnd difﬁcult to accept—we ﬁnd this form of representation of nature one that
we need to step back from and ask more complex and historical questions, questions that
do prize diversity. But we have to do it from the point of view of the speciﬁc political and
economic histories that human societies and human cultures of the modern age have par-
ticipated in and the profound and deep transformations—which have required violence in
simpliﬁcation, violence toward human beings, simpliﬁcation of our natural ecological
systems, leading to what is clearly the planetary ecological crisis that we face, whose outlines
I put forward to you today.
And, therefore, to conclude I’ll just say, although we have to think very carefully about
what justice for non-human life forms might mean before we dare take a chance of repre-
senting what that justice is, we can see the co-implications between the foundations of
human life and of social reproduction with non-human life forms and the material bio-
chemical infrastructure that is the basis of life on this planet. In that sense justice for
humans necessarily needs to come before justice for the environment, but this is also
justice for the environment. Thank you.
VERONICA STRANG: Thank you. I would like to sum up by just very brieﬂy reminding
you of my four key points. One, that the notion of justice is fundamentally concerned with
balancing relations between those who have power and those who don’t, and, as my col-
league said, those who cannot speak for themselves. Two, that we’re bound together in
interdependent processes of production and reproduction such that the lack of justice
for the non-human can have terminally disruptive effects on others and, indeed, all of
us. Three, that our categories are problematic and don’t reﬂect the realities of human-
environmental relations, and, four, that we manifest the ideas and values that we promote.
Now, I’m very sympathetic to the concerns of my colleagues who prioritise justice for
people. I think anthropologists should indeed campaign passionately for justice for
humans, and over the last several decades I’ve spent a great deal of time working with
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Aboriginal communities on land rights and more recently in New Zealand with Maori
groups to protect rights to water, but I just don’t think that justice for people is enough. I
don’t think we can achieve justice for people without simultaneously ensuring a balance
of justice for the non-human, and I think that we have to ﬁnd ways to consider what that
means and act accordingly, because whatever the short term needs, and we all know
they’re pressing, I think we would be failing in our tasks as scientists and thinkers if we
don’t recognise and articulate our interdependence with the non-humans and encourage
societies to act accordingly. In practical terms, you know, if communities that I work with
were to propose activities that would threaten the survival of other species or ecosystems,
I would fear that there’s a moral and intellectual imperative, and a practical imperative, to
suggest alternate ways forward. And I don’t actually think any of the communities I work
with would have a problem with anthropologists taking that position.
I think it’s very easy to be suborned to buy into discourses about what constitutes justice
for people in neoliberal economies. This is so entangled with notions of development and
progress that are presented in material terms and the right to have access to technologies,
the right to have access to resources, to share the wealth. And the notion of development—
and I do wonder very often if the notion of sustainable development isn’t, in fact, an oxy-
moron—seems inevitably tied to the adoption of growth-based economic practices in
which the costs are invariably externalised to other species and things. And, as my
account of the species extinctions has illustrated, this has led to a very sharp loss of
justice for the environment. I would put it to you that it will also lead, is leading, not to
a better distribution of wealth or human rights, but to greater conﬂict over land and
resources and so, in the longer term, to less justice for people.
So, to date, the prioritisation of immediate human needs and the adherence to the
view of humankind as somehow separate from nature or the environment has
brought us to the point where we’re actually in danger of bringing down the ecosystems
on which we rely. In that, in the larger scheme of things, [I] suggest that asking more
complex historical questions—while it’s a very valid point of view involving prioritising
the justice of people—until we’ve sorted out those complex questions may constitute ﬁd-
dling while Rome burns. So, for me, this debate raises a question as to what we as anthro-
pologists want to promote as a vision for humankind, not just now, but in the longer
term.
I think we can all agree that the non-human and human relations are social-political
relations. The bioethical position that we adopt reﬂects the balance of power, the
balance of justice in these, and when we resituate ourselves within those relationships,
it actually seems rather repellant to promote a way forward, to suggest that human
needs must always come ﬁrst. I would rather see anthropology present an integrated con-
ceptual view and a moral lead that upholds the capacity for collaborative rather than com-
petitive relationships, not only between human groups but between human and other
kinds, and that to me means giving simultaneous, not secondary, consideration to the
needs of non-human species and ecosystems. So I would argue that rather than prioritising
justice for people, we should instead promote justice for all, and I ask you to vote against
the motion. Thank you.
In a vote by the audience, the motion was defeated.
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Notes
1. See http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/subjects/social-anthropology/our-research/group
-debates-in-anthropological-theory/ and http://coa.sagepub.com/content/33/3/300.abstract.
2. In theoretical terms, both ecological Marxism (e.g., O’Connor 1998) and most variants of pol-
itical ecology (e.g. Biersack 2006) are in agreement regarding these propositions.
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